David Minor v. Beverly Hastings by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-22-2017 
David Minor v. Beverly Hastings 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"David Minor v. Beverly Hastings" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 816. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/816 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2082 
_____________ 
 
DAVID MINOR, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
BEVERLY HASTINGS; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 1-13-cv-00558) 
District Judge: Hon. Jerome B. Simandle  
______________ 
 
Argued  
April 25, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 22, 2017) 
 
Steven G. Sanders, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Anne M. Collart, Esq.  
Gibbons P.C. 
One Gateway Center 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
 Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Frank J. Ducoat, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Maria I. Guerrero, Esq. 
Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Esq. 
Essex County Office of Prosecutor 
50 West Market Street 
2 
 
Essex County Veterans Courthouse 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
 Attorneys for Appellees 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________________ 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant David Minor appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his habeas 
petition.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.1 
I. 
 
Minor appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court, arguing that the trial court had violated his constitutional rights when it 
concluded that he had not made out a prima facie showing of race discrimination in jury 
selection.  He also argued that the prosecutor deprived him of his right to a fair trial by 
misstating the burden of proof in summation and effectively directing a guilty verdict.  
The court rejected the first claim, holding that Minor “did not make a prima facie 
showing that the jury was not drawn from a representative cross-section of the 
community.”2  The court also rejected Minor’s second claim based largely on the trial 
court’s curative instructions.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
2 App. at 294. 
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 The New Jersey Supreme Court denied Minor’s petition for discretionary review.  
Minor then filed a pro se application for habeas relief.  The District Court denied Minor’s 
application.  Minor filed his notice of appeal and a pro se motion for a Certificate of 
Appealability, which we granted as to both of the aforementioned issues. 
I. 
 We apply the same standard of review as the District Court pursuant to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).3  Under AEDPA, an 
application for habeas relief shall not be granted for any claim adjudicated on the merits 
in state court unless the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or 
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”4   
 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 
clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must 
also be [objectively] unreasonable.”5 
II. 
                                              
3 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  
4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 
5 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).  
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Minor argues that (1) the state court unreasonably applied Darden v. Wainwright6 
when it did not find that the weakness of the State’s evidence combined with the 
prosecution’s improper summation concerning the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt 
deprived Minor of a fair trial; and (2) the state court unreasonably applied Johnson v. 
California7 when it did not proceed to step two under a Batson analysis.  We do not find 
the state court’s determinations to be unreasonable, and thus, we must affirm the District 
Court’s decision. 
A. Prosecution’s Summation 
 A petitioner is deprived of a fair trial where “the prosecutor’s comments so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.”8  In making this determination, the reviewing court “must examine the 
prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the 
severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of 
evidence against the defendant.”9  “[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the instruction 
‘could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.”10   
                                              
6 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
7 545 U.S. 162 (2005). 
8 Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (same). 
9 Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001).  
10 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994).  
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 A petitioner is not prejudiced where prosecutor’s comments are “invited by” 11 or 
are a “fair reply to defense counsel’s” comments.12  Further, curative instructions may 
correct an improper remark where “the judge direct[s] the jury’s attention to the remark 
particularly challenged [], declare[s] it to be unsupported, and admonishe[s] the jury to 
ignore it.”13    
 Here, although the prosecution’s summation was troublesome, it did not so infect 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process under 
our standard of deferential review.  First, the prosecution’s comments did not manipulate 
or misstate the evidence.  Second, the comments were in response to defense counsel’s 
arguments.  Third, the trial court provided the jurors with curative instructions, including 
the correct explanation of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed 
the jury to ignore any statement made by counsel regarding the law.  In light of this, we 
cannot say that the state court’s decision denying Minor’s claim for relief because of the 
prosecution’s summation “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”   
B. Batson claim 
                                              
11 Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. 
12 United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1128 (3d Cir. 1990). 
13 Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 644; see also Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1128 (“[A]s appellants did 
not object to the curative instruction or request additional instructions, they apparently 
were satisfied with the district court’s response and cannot now complain that comments 
gave rise to reversible error.”). 
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 Minor also argues that the state court did not comply with Johnson v. California  
when it held that Minor had not raised an inference of discrimination in jury selection.  
This claim is more troubling. 
 To establish a Batson challenge, the defendant must first “make a prima facie 
showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.”14  
If the defendant makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to present a 
race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.15  The trial court must then 
determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful 
discrimination.16  In Johnson, the Supreme Court clarified that the first step under Batson 
is not intended to “be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge-on 
the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with 
certainty-that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful 
discrimination.”17 
 In determining whether a defendant has made the requisite showing, “the trial 
court should consider all relevant circumstances.  For example, a ‘pattern’ of strikes 
against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of 
discrimination.”18  This Court has identified the following five factors that are relevant 
                                              
14 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 96-97 (1986)). 
15 Id. at 359. 
16 Id. 
17 545 U.S. at 163.   
18 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.  
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when assessing whether a prima facie showing of discrimination has been made: “1) the 
number of racial group members in the panel; 2) the nature of the crime; 3) the race of the 
defendant; 4) a pattern of strikes against racial group members; and 5) the questions and 
statement[s] during the voir dire.”19  Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, 
the prosecution bears the burden of providing “a neutral explanation for challenging 
black jurors.”20  “[T]he trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory 
intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal and will 
not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.”21 
 We agree that this record is worrisome insofar as Minor’s Batson claim is 
concerned.  Yet, the trial court required the prosecutor to justify her challenges, and she 
did so.  However, the prosecutor then complained that the State “now has run out of its 
challenges” and asked the court to excuse the jury and begin anew because “the majority 
                                              
19 Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 722 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
20 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.  
21 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Appellate Division and the District Court also seem to have erred in their 
application of Miller-El to this case.  The Supreme Court’s requirement for deference to a 
trial court’s Batson finding is limited to the discriminatory intent prong of Batson, and 
not to the initial prima facie showing.  See Id. at 339 (“[T]he court’s finding of the 
absence of discriminatory intent is . . . accorded significant deference.”).  The District 
Court was incorrect in relying on Miller-El for the proposition that a trial court may 
consider the ultimate composition in the first step of Batson, as Miller-El addressed the 
denial of a COA after petitioner’s Batson claim was denied at step three.  The State in 
Batson had conceded that petitioner had satisfied Step One; the only issue was whether 
Step Three had been satisfied.  Id. at 338.      
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of the individuals on the jury are African American.”22  The trial court denied the State’s 
motion.  Ultimately, the majority of jurors in Minor’s trial were African American.23 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor did offer race-neutral reasons for the strikes removing 
African American jurors, the record supports those nonracial reasons, and the trial court 
found that the prosecutor’s reasons were credible.   Therefore, although the prosecution’s 
comments on the second day of voir dire are worrisome, given the ultimate composition 
of the jury, the credited race-neutral explanations for the challenged strikes, and the 
significant deference we afford to the trial court’s finding, we cannot say that the state 
court’s denial of Minor’s Batson claim “was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  Although we 
may well have reached a different result if we were reviewing this record de novo, given 
the limitations of our appellate review under AEDPA, we must affirm the District Court’s 
decision.  
IV. 
 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
  
                                              
22 App. at 812. 
23 The Appellate Division incorrectly focused on the ultimate composition of the jury at 
Step One.  At that stage, all that matters is whether any juror was being removed because 
of race.  Being required to defeat the ultimate composition of the jury at Step One would 
impose too high of a burden at that stage.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (“A single 
invidiously discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of such 
discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.”); see also Madison v. 
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1333, 1338 (state court reached a decision 
“contrary to clearly established federal law . . . because the court increased [petitioner’s] 
prima facie burden beyond what Batson requires.”). 
